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Critical Theory and the
Pragmatist Challengel
Dmitri N. Shalin
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Habermas's theory breaks with the Continental tradition that has
denigrated pragmatism as an Anglo-Saxon philosophy subservient
to technocratic capitalism. While Habermas deftly uses pragmatist
insights into communicative rationality and democratic ethos, he
shows little sensitivity to other facets of pragmatism. This article
argues that incorporating the pragmatist perspective on experience
and indeterminacy brings a corrective to the emancipatory agenda
championed by critical theorists. The pragmatist alternative to the
theory of communicative action is presented, with the discussion
centering around the following themes: disembodied reason versus
embodied reasonableness, determinate being versus indeterminate
reality, discursive truth versus pragmatic certainty, rational consensus versus reasonable dissent, transcendental democracy versus
democratic transcendence, and rational society versus sane community.
For much of the 20th century, pragmatism was perceived in Europe as
a crude expression of Anglo-Saxon utilitarianism. Even thinkers sympathetic to the new American current found it inferior to the Continental
philosophical tradition. Less charitable critics, such as the writers close
to the critical theory circle, dismissed pragmatism as instrumental reason
run amok, a technocratic decisionism severed from substantive-rational
moorings. It was not until the 1960s that respectable European thinkers
began to pay more favorable attention to pragmatism and its sociological
counterpart, symbolic interactionism. A notable example is Jiirgen Ha1

This is a revision of a paper presented at the 85th annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association. I wish to thank participants in the Sociology Department
Seminar at Boston University for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
The critical feedback from Mitchell Aboulafia, Thomas Alexander, Bob Antonio,
Thomas Burger, Lewis Coser, Bruce Mazlish, Gene Rochberg-Halton, and Lon
Shelby is also gratefully appreciated. Finally, I wish to thank the three AJS reviewers
for their comments and suggestions. Correspondence may be directed to Dmitri Shalin,
Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas,
Nevada 89154.
© 1992 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0002-9602/93/9802-0001$01.50

AJS Volume 98 Number 2 (September 1992): 237-79

This content downloaded from 131.216.164.48 on Tue, 7 May 2013 17:09:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

237

American Journal of Sociology
bermas, who recently admitted, "I have for a long time identified myself
with that radical democratic mentality which is present in the best American traditions and articulated in American pragmatism" (Habermas
1985, p. 198). This statement is noteworthy not only because it holds
fresh promise for a transatlantic dialogue, but also because it points to
critical thinkers' renewed interest in liberal democracy and its emancipatory potential.
While the search for common ground will be welcomed on this side of
the Atlantic, it will also raise some eyebrows. There are many points on
which critical theorists and writers steeped in pragmatism appear to part
company. The former have a penchant for totalities, are conversant with
rationality at large, and have profound reservations about bourgeois democracy, whereas the latter attend to the particular, revel in multiple
rationalities, and place much stock in democratic institutions. So, when
Habermas (1986, p. 193) describes pragmatism as "a missing branch of
Young Hegelianism," he is sure to make some critics wonder if his European biases blinded him to pragmatism's native roots.
I see nothing objectionable in the efforts to trace pragmatism's European lineage. Nor do I agree with those who think Habermas has gotten
pragmatism all wrong. A movement as diverse as this lends itself to
more than one reading, and Habermas does an important service by
illuminating its various facets-most notably its political dimensionwhich American sociologists claiming the pragmatist legacy tend to ignore. Still, I want to take issue with Habermas because something is
amiss in his analysis-the pragmatist sensitivity to indeterminacy, contingency, and chaos. This sensitivity is remarkably in tune with trends
in modern science, and it deserves far closer attention from sociologists
than it has been granted so far. It is my contention that taking objective
indeterminacy seriously would require rethinking central conclusions in
Habermas's theory of communicative action. In particular, I would like
to show that Habermas elevated verbal intellect at the expense of noncognitive intelligence and thereby truncated the pragmatist notion of experience. I will also argue that incorporating the pragmatist perspective on
democracy brings an important corrective to the emancipatory agenda
championed by critical theorists.
Critical theory and Habermas have received a fair amount of attention
(Jay 1973; Rose 1978; McCarthy 1978; Held 1980; Geuss 1981; Kellner
1985; Thompson and Held 1982; Antonio 1983; Bernstein and Forester
1985; Ferrara 1985; Benhabib 1987; Wolin 1987). Aside from Antonio
(1989), however, few authors explored in depth the interfaces between
pragmatism, democracy, and Habermas's thought, and none, to my
knowledge, incorporated the pragmatist perspective on experience and
explored its implications for Habermas's views. My discussion centers
238
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on the theory of communicative actions-a segment in Habermas's total
corpus in which he joins issues with pragmatism and makes a concerted
effort to incorporate its democratic ethos into the quintessentially European project of critical theory. I begin with the sources of critical theorists' ambivalence toward democracy. Next, I examine how Habermas
merged the pragmatist and critical theory traditions. And finally, I subject his construction to criticism, using the pragmatist notions of experience, indeterminacy, and democracy as analytical tools.
FROMCRITICALIDEALISMTO CRITICALTHEORY
It was not until Kant ([1781] 1966, p. xxiv) declared, "Our age is, in
every sense of the word, the age of criticism, and everything must submit
to it," that the term "critical" entered the philosophical lexicon in its
modern sense. Kant chose his nomenclature deliberately to highlight the
difference between the age of reason and the age of criticism, between
overconfident rationalism of philosophes and "my transcendental or, better, critical idealism" (Kant [1783] 1950, p. 41). According to Kant,
reason could no longer derive its mandate from divine inspiration or
natural law but must lay its own standards for judging the true, the
good, and the beautiful. For reason is not an outside observer impartially
stating the truth and legislating a better future but a participant-observer
whose rational activity gives the world its meaning and whose very unreflexivity breeds oppression. The objective structures one finds in the
world, physical or social, are grounded in the a priori structures of the
mind itself. To change the former, the subject has to grasp the latter. In
other words, emancipation starts with self-reflection; only after reason
has exposed its own prejudices and learned its own limits can it proceed
with its appointed task. Hence, the endless exhortations by Kant's successors to do away with "the dogmatic tendency in man" (Fichte [1794]
1970, p. 161) and "dogmatism as a way of thinking" (Hegel [1807] 1967,
p. 99) and get on with "a strenuous reacquisition of everything which
has once been acquired" (Schelling [1800] 1978, p. 1).
These utterings sound vaguely subversive, but in the postrevolutionary
climate of early 19th-century Europe they had a distinctly conservative
ring to them. Anxious to avoid the bloody excesses of the French Revolution, critical idealists hastened to assure the world that the project of
modernity they inherited from the Enlightenment would be carried out
by peaceful means. The only force they were willing to tolerate was the
force of reason itself-reason firmly grounded in principles, conscious
of its moral moorings, and committed to the public good. This is what
post-Kantian idealists called Vernunft and what they juxtaposed to Verstand, or everyday understanding, that, unbeknownst to itself, weaves
239
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the familiar world from its biases, preconceptions, and particularistic
interests. Viewed from this angle, the battle for emancipation is but "the
battle of reason . . . to break the rigidity to which understanding has
reduced everything" (Hegel [1817] 1975, p. 53).
Vernunft is bound to strike some readers as an oversoul or a superhuman agency, but there is nothing especially mysterious about it. While
the telos of reason is humanity as a whole, its locus operandi is the
individual who speaks on behalf of reason. Society is fully rational when
its members heed the claims of reason they have raised, when they act
their conscience and submit to a tribunal within which one is simultaneously a defendant and a judge: "The consciousness of an inner tribunal
in man . . . is conscience. . . . This original intellectual and . . . moral
capacity, called conscience, has this peculiarity, that although its business is a business of a man with himself, he is obliged by his reason to
look upon it as carried on at the command of another person. For the
transaction is here the conduct of a law-case . . . before a judge" (Kant
[1803] 1904, p. 289).
The spirit of this statement is remarkably modern and democratic; it
implies that every individual, regardless of origin or status, is a rational
being and a potential agent of emancipation whose dormant capacity for
criticism can be roused by the critical idealists' path-breaking intellections. Emancipation through reason transpires here as a project that
humans qua rational beings accomplish by subjecting to critical analysis
the a priori grounds for their conduct, freeing themselves from prejudices, and unswervingly following standards they have justified to themselves as universal, equitable, and humane.
The project of emancipation through reason came under attack during
the reaction that followed the French Revolution, but its bourgeois democratic ethos continued to nourish the moral imagination well into the 19th
century. This ethos was still palpable in the young Marx, who called for
"a ruthless criticism of everything existing" ([1843] 1972, p. 8) and urged
the "reform of consciousness [which] consists solely in letting the world
perceive its own consciousness by awakening it from dreaming about
itself, in explaining to it its own actions" ([1843] 1971, p. 82). Marx's
commitment to emancipation through criticism, however, wore thin in
the revolutionary climate of the time. By the mid-1840s, he began to
doubt the peaceable route to emancipation and, along with other young
Hegelians, set out to investigate what keeps reason from exercising its
curative powers. The main impediment, Marx concluded, was class domination and the institutions, such as law, morality, and philosophy,
through which the capitalist state obfuscates its oppression and perpetuates false consciousness among the toiling masses. The ruling class has
the power to protect its particularistic interests, and it is naive to believe
240
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that it would bow to the voice of universal reason and agree to yield
its power peacefully. Bourgeois democracy is a sham; its much-touted
freedoms stand in the path of emancipation, insofar as they legitimize
exploitation and prevent workers from understanding their role as a driving force in history. The real hope for emancipation lies with the concrete
historical agent, the proletariat, a universal class for which criticism is
not just a theoretical endeavor but a practical revolutionary deed. It is
this class that can bring about communism-a society based on genuinely
free discourse. Such a society frees consciousness from systematic ideological distortions, brings every rational individual into critical discourse,
and thus for the first time makes reason truly universal and society fully
rational.
The dilemma Marx bequeathed to his successors-Must reason rely
on democratic procedures or class violence to achieve its emancipatory
objectives?-informs many debates about critical theory in the 20th century. Few participants in these debates failed to acknowledge that "the
critical theory is the heir of . . . German idealism" (Horkheimer [1937]
1976, p. 223). All agreed that critical theory aims at "the transformation
of society [that] eliminates the original relationship between substructure
and superstructure"(Marcuse [1937] 1968, p. 144; see also Marcuse 1960)
and has as its ultimate goal "a society in which the 'people' have become
autonomous individuals [freely] choosing their government and determining their life" (Adorno 1965, p. 105). How exactly these goals were to
be accomplished, however, remained a contentious issue. The fact that
bourgeois democracy had failed to forestall fascism in Europe seriously
undermined the trust in liberalism's emancipatory potential. The disillusionment ran especially deep among the writers gathered around Horkheimer and the Frankfurt school, whose members sought to forge a conceptual link between totalitarianism and liberal rationalism. The
impotence of bourgeois democracy is transparent in its surrenderto totalitarianism, the kind that the Third Reich exemplifies most vividly. Indeed, "we can say that liberalism 'produces' the total authoritarian state
out of itself, as its own consummation at a more advanced stage of
development" (Marcuse 1968a, p. 19). "The pattern of all administration
and 'personnel policy,"' according to Adorno ([1951] 1978, p. 131),
"tends of its own accord . . . towards Fascism." Horkheimer (1978, p.
219) concurred with this diagnosis, charging that, left to its own devices,
"democracy leads to its opposite-tyranny."
Critical theorists were aware that the United States did not fit neatly
into this scenario, yet they convinced themselves that America was rapidly moving toward the "administered state," whose more subtle forms
of domination bore equally ill tidings. The media-based domination they
found in capitalist America looked every bit as pervasive, even if some241
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what more benign, as the one achieved in a totalitarian state. The cultural industry of capitalism works over time to produce mass consciousness suitable for the market economy and amenable to social control.
Marcuse's (1964) One-Dimensional Man is the best-known account of
the bondage in which reason finds itself in a capitalist society, although
the basic insights articulated in this book had been familiar to critical
theorists for decades (Horkheimer and Adorno [1944] 1989, p. 222).
While critical thinkers had few reasons to cheer European liberalism,
they could not find much solace in the Marxist scenario either. For one
thing, the proletarian masses failed to reveal themselves as the agents of
historical emancipation Marx hailed them to be; rather, they displayed
unmistakably conservative leanings and then precisely in the countries
where "late capitalism" seemed to have reached its final stage. As the
century unfolded, critical theorists also became painfully aware that the
states claiming Marx's legacy had evolved their own totalitarianism, one
that was equally inimical to critical theory's lofty ideals. Already in the
1920s, critical thinkers questioned Marx's thesis about "the universal
class" and spurned Lukac's apology for communist party domination.
After World War II, their disaffection for Marxist states and Left totalitarianism grew stronger (Neumann 1953, pp. 15-19; Marcuse 1958;
Adorno [1966] 1973, p. 367; Horkheimer 1978, p. 230). Horkheimer expressed this indignation with particular force, sparing neither "the tendency toward fascism in capitalist states" nor "a sudden turn of leftradical opposition into terrorist totalitarianism" (1978, pp. 230, 233).
Marcuse was perhaps the only member of the original Frankfurt school
willing to sanctify violence, to say that it was "a 'natural right' of resistance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use extralegal means"
(1965, p. 116). But his views did not sit well with the old-generation
critical thinkers, who refused to endorse left-wing terrorism and student
militancy. This refusal precipitated the split within the New Left, with
the younger generation opting for radical action and the older one left
wallowing in doubt about critical theory's practical import. "There certainly can be no true criticism without an intellectually grounded hope
which derives its legitimacy from realistic possibilities," urged Horkheimer (1978, p. 138). Yet with the liberal path toward emancipation
blocked by the market-driven media and with class warfare discarded as
a viable alternative, it was precisely "an intellectually grounded hope"
that critical thinkers found in short supply. After the Second World War
in particular it became obvious to many observers that "Critical Theory
was now incapable of suggesting critical praxis" (Jay 1973, p. 279). It
was in this climate of uncertainty about the prospects for emancipation
that critical theorists proclaimed the eclipse of reason and embraced
Weber's prophesies about rationalization's crippling effect on democracy.
242
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What attracted Frankfurt school theorists to Weber was his unromantic view of reason as an agency whose power to control the world subverts
human longing for meaningful life. This ironic capacity to render the
world manageable and meaningless at the same time has been a central
theme in emancipatory scholarship from the start. Already in his prizewinning Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Rousseau articulated the
paradox of industry begetting poverty and culture breeding oppression.
Critical idealists developed it further in their metaphysics of reason that
remains estranged from itself and its products until it realizes its own
responsibility for the world out there. Marx's theory, which blends the
French Enlightenment and German idealism, offered another variation
on this theme: history is the ongoing struggle of humanity to free itself
from the dehumanizing consequences of its relentless drive to perfect the
production forces-the drive that multiplies goods and miseries alike.
These insights, minus the attendant optimism about reason's ultimate
triumph, found their way into Weber's theory of global rationalization.
Reason's power to assert control, to increase efficiency, to calculate
the future-to achieve any proximate goal-is designated by Weber as
"instrumental" or "formal rationality." The capacity to judge value, to
realize a higher purpose, to pursue a just cause-to lead a meaningful
life-is termed "value" or "substantive rationality" (Weber 1964, pp.
184-86, 211-12). The relationship between the two is antinomian: the
greater mastery reason achieves over the world of things and events, the
less room is left for the questions of meaning and value; the more organized reason becomes internally, the narrower the scope for personal
choice; the farther the state extends its bureaucratic procedures, the heavier its domination over the individual. A telling example is representative
democracy, which purports to express the people's will but in fact subverts its professed goal by virtue of its complexity, its pervasive legalism,
and its growing dependence on party leaders, who inexorably come to
dominate politics. Democracy, Weber (1964, pp. 407-23) concluded, is
the most efficient form of domination, all the more pernicious that it
conceals its totalitarian proclivities under the veneer of bureaucratic rationality and popular rhetoric. The future of modernity is the "iron cage"
that reason has unwittingly forged for itself and where it is destined to
dwell-unfree, disenchanted, longing for meaning, unsure of its higher
purpose (Weber [1904-5] 1958, p. 182).2
It is easy to see how much Critique of Instrumental Reason, One-Dimensional Man, or Negative Dialectics owes to this dark vision. Weber's
unsentimental insights into the rationalization process and its unintended
2 For further discussion of Weber's views on formal and substantive democracy see
Giddens (1972), Mommsen (1974), and Cohen (1985).
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systemic consequences have been absorbed into such critical-theoretic
concepts as the "administered state," "totalitarian democracy," "expert
cultures," "isolation through communication," and "media-distorted
discourse." His disdain for formal democracy seems to have been borne
out by actual historical developments in the capitalist West and the communist East. And his skepticism about the prospects for substantive democracy neatly rationalized the Frankfurt school's failure to tie its theory
to political practice. There was a penalty, of course, that critical theorists
had to pay for embracing Weber-surrendering rational hope for emancipation. This was what "melancholy science," as Adorno dubbed critical
theory, was coming to. And this was why Jiirgen Habermas found the
Frankfurt school's confines too narrow and moved beyond its fold. He
did it to take a fresh look at the question that the old-generation critical
thinkers left unanswered: Is emancipation through reason a rational
hope? Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action can be seen as an
attempt to invigorate critical theory by merging the Continental and
Anglo-Saxon traditions and bringing the pragmatist perspective to bear
on the project of emancipation through reason.
FROMCRITICALTHEORY TO COMMUNICATIVEACTION
"It is only in Western nations that the precarious and continually threatened achievements of bourgeois emancipation and the worker's movement are guaranteed to any extent worth mentioning.... And we know
just how important bourgeois freedoms are. For when things go wrong
it is those on the Left who become the first victims" (Habermas 1986,
p. 42). This intriguing observation illuminates a paradox: the very fact
that the Institute for Social Research, the hotbed of critical thinking, has
been thriving in capitalist West Germany seems to suggest that it serves
the existing order. This contradiction has not been lost on the right- and
left-wing critics, who alternatively charged the Frankfurt school leaders
with ingratitude toward the existing order or betraying working-class
interests. In their defense, critical theorists pointed to the marginal position they occupy in the academe, the media's power to blunt the critical
message, and the false consciousness pervading capitalist society, yet
these explanations are rather half-hearted, given the prominent positions
that critical theorists acquired in German academia after World War II,
and they certainly do not go to the heart of the matter. The real problem
is that "the old Frankfurt School never took bourgeois democracy very
seriously" (Habermas 1986, p. 98). By contrast, Habermas takes pains
to emphasize that academic freedom is for real, that bourgeois democracy
is a major historical accomplishment, and that its liberal institutions are
indispensable for genuine criticism. All this by no means obviates the
244
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fundamental criticism that critical theorists have leveled against the capitalist order, most signally against "the pervasive inequality of freedom
[and] unequal opportunity of access to the means of democratic persuasion" (Marcuse [1968] 1976, p. 326). Habermas accepts the premise that
the rationalization process has produced systemic consequences highly
injurious to the democratic process: modern systems are unmanageably
complex; a consumerist economy manufactures false needs; the mass media manipulates public opinion; expert cultures obfuscate the public's
stake in technical issues; and relentless bureaucratization robs humans
of their autonomy, dignity, and solidarity (Habermas [1962] 1989, pp.
141-222; [1981] 1987b, pp. 332-73). These are the familiar ills of late
capitalism. Formidable though they are, they do not spell democracy's
impending doom. The old-school critical theorists have grown unreasonably pessimistic about the project of modernity, but their pessimism is
historically unfounded and theoretically fallacious; the prospects for
emancipation through reason "can today no longer be disqualified as
simply utopian" (Habermas 1989, p. 235). The agenda for the day is "the
reconciliation of a modernity which has fallen apart," the rededication to
the idea "that without surrendering the differentiation that modernity
has made possible in the cultural and economic spheres, one can find
forms of living together in which autonomy and dependency can truly
enter into a non-antagonistic relation, that one can walk tall in a collectivity that does not have the dubious quality of backward-looking substantial forms of community" (Habermas 1986, p. 125). To salvage the project of modernity, critical theory must cure the democratic process of
distortions it suffers in a capitalist society. How can this be done? Habermas answers with a prescription borrowed from American pragmatism: by mobilizing the public, revitalizing public discourse, and getting
personally involved in politics.
Habermas's willingness to join issues with pragmatism is very much
at odds with the German tradition, in which the intellectual was "bred
in the veneration of theory and history, and contempt for empiricism and
pragmatism" (Neumann 1953, p. 19). Frankfurt school thinkers were
solidly embedded in this tradition, their writings evincing little appreciation for pragmatism's emancipatory potential (Marcuse 1939/1940; Horkheimer 1937, 1947). They dismissed pragmatism in a wholesale fashion as
"the abasement of reason" and "a genuine expression of the positivistic
approach," a philosophy which advocates the "reduction of reason to a
mere instrument" and serves as a "counterpart of modern industrialism,
for which the factory is the prototype of human existence, and which
models all branches of culture after production on the conveyor belt,
or after the rationalized front office" (Horkheimer 1947, pp. 45-54).
Habermas's break with this tradition was not instantaneous. According
245
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to his own account (Habermas 1986, pp. 104, 151, 193), his interest in
pragmatism goes back to the early 1960s, when Karl-Otto Apel encouraged him to read Peirce and other pragmatists. Knowledge and Interest,
published in Germany in 1968 (Habermas 1971; see also Habermas 1975),
is the first work in which Habermas treats pragmatism systematically.
There is no mention of Mead in this volume, Dewey is cited once or
twice, but Peirce is treated at length as a representative pragmatist
thinker. The treatment is more sympathetic than the one accorded by
Marcuse and Horkheimer, but it does not break completely with the
thesis, first advanced by Max Scheler ([1926] 1977), that pragmatism
exemplifies a formal-rational preoccupation with nature that undermines
the normative discourse embedded in substantive rationality. What Habermas (1986, p. 193) finds appealing in Peirce is the "logical socialism"
implicit in the latter's exalted view of a community of rational thinkers
engaged in critical inquiry and ceaselessly advancing toward the truth
through uncoerced discourse, rational argumentation, and consensus
building. It was not until Habermas encountered Dewey and Mead, however, that he fully realized the momentous implications that Peirce's ideas
had for critical theory.
"The radical-democratic branch of Young Hegelianism" is the term
Habermas (1986, p. 151) coined to frame the pragmatism espoused by
Dewey and Mead. This apt description highlights the often overlooked
debt that pragmatist thinkers owe to German idealism, the ingenuous
manner in which Peirce, Dewey, Mead, and to a lesser extent, William
James developed a Hegelian concern with language, communication, and
intersubjectivity-the social dimension of reason. Dewey's writings were
particularly instrumental in sensitizing Habermas to the continuity between scientific inquiry and democratic discourse, to the fact that "freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication,
the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate
intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as in the scientific
method" (Dewey 1939, p. 102). From the same source comes Habermas's
appreciation for the public and its role in sustaining inquiry into communal affairs. The prospect for democracy, Dewey contended and Habermas agreed, "rests upon persuasion, upon ability to convince and be
convinced," upon "the improvement of the methods and conditions of
debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public"
(Dewey 1916a, p. 134; 1939, p. 102). Taking the argument one step
further, Dewey (1946, p. 132) comes up with an appeal that critical
theorists would have appreciated, if not fully endorsed: "Humane liberalism in order to save itself must cease to deal with symptoms and go to
the causes of which inequalities and oppressions are but the symptoms.
In order to endure under present conditions, liberalism must become
246
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radical in the sense that, instead of using social power to ameliorate the
evil consequences of the existing system, it shall use social power to
change the system."
Mead caught Habermas's attention for some of the same reasons that
Dewey did, but in addition to Mead's progressive democratic agenda,
Habermas found in his writings a theory that "elevated symbolically
mediated interaction to the new paradigm of reason" and that signified
a major advance beyond the old "paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness" (Habermas 1984, p. 390). This point, crucial to Habermas's
own project, deserves some elaboration. We can recall that critical idealists placed much stock in the historical process that elevates biased, unreflexive, everyday understanding (Verstand) to the loftier status of selfconscious reason that spearheads criticism and attends to higher truths
(Vernunft). Habermas traces this trust in the noble faculties of reason to
the tradition that stretches from Descartes, through German idealism, to
critical theorists. The problem with this tradition, as Habermas sees it,
is that it does not incorporate the sociological perspective on reason as a
communicative affair; instead, it treats reason as a unitary phenomenon
modeled after instrumental labor activity, as a process bound to the
subject, who confronts the world all alone and single-handedly transforms it into a rational objective whole. Hegel's objective idealism did
entail some tantalizing insights into the role that language and community play in the genesis of self-consciousness, but much of his work followed the old paradigm, and whatever sociologically relevant ideas he
had presaged failed to take root on German soil.3 By contrast, American
pragmatists seized exactly this neglected aspect of German idealism, expanding it into a new paradigm of reason as social through and through.
Sidestepping the familiar pair of Verstand and Vernunft, the new paradigm gives prominence to Verstindigung, the interactive process of reaching understanding. "The change in perspective from solitary rational
purposiveness to social interaction," writes Habermas (1987a, p. 149),
"does promise to illuminate the very process of mutual understanding
[Verstdndigung]-and not merely of understanding [Verstehen]." Mead,
Habermas continues, resolutely renounced the paradigm of reason as
solitary consciousness and went further than other contemporary scholars
to lay out the paradigm of reason as communicative action and to spell
out its implications for the emancipatory agenda, which is why Mead's

3 Habermas may be underestimating the extent to which the social dimension of reason
was elaborated in the German tradition in general and in transcendental idealism in
particular. For an alternative view, see Royce (1919, p. 65), Mead (1936, p. 147), and
Shalin (1986a, 1986b).
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ideas must be included in any theory that assigns to self-consciousness
and critique a role in social reconstruction.
Indeed, Mead not only joins in the classical discourse on rationality
and emancipation through reason-he also pushes it in a new direction.
His discussion owes much to German idealism, which Mead studied as
a student at Harvard and in Berlin and then taught for many years at
the University of Chicago.4 His views on evolution as a process that
brings nature to self-consciousness and assures humans "some degree of
control of the process of evolution out of which they arose" (Mead 1938,
p. 511) bring to mind Hegel's phenomenology, with its dialectics of reason that objectifies itself in nature, finds itself estranged from its own
products, and then gradually rediscovers its authorship over the way
things are. But Mead's approach is also thoroughly informed by the
evolutionary perspective and the pragmatist determination to tie thinking
to conduct. "What I have attempted to do," explains Mead (1934, p.
334), "is to bring rationality back to a certain type of conduct, the type
of conduct in which the individual puts himself in the attitude of the
whole community to which he belongs. This implies that the whole group
is involved in some organized activity and that in this organized activity
the action of one calls for the action of the other organisms involved.
What we term 'reason' arises when one of the organisms takes into its
own response the attitude of the other organisms involved. . . When it
does so, it is what we term 'a rational being."' Reason is historically
embedded in communal existence; once brought into being, it transforms
community life itself, for, according to Mead, "when the process of evolution has passed under the control of social reason" (1938, p. 508), it
"becomes not only self-conscious but also self-critical" (1934, p. 255).
From a central preoccupation with the mastery over things, reason now
turns toward the questions of value. To use Weberian terminology, reason becomes substantive; that is, it reevaluates values, rationally resolves
social conflicts, and endeavors to revamp the entire social order from
which it sprang:
The rational solution of the conflict, however, calls for the reconstruction
of both habits and values, and this involves transcending the order of the
community. A hypothetically different order suggests itself and becomes
the end in conduct....
In logical terms there is established a universe of
discourse which transcends the specific order within which the members
of the community may, in a specific conflict, place themselves outside of
the community order as it exists, and agree upon changed habits of action
and a restatement of values. Rational procedure, therefore, sets up an order
within which thought operates....
Its claims are the claims of reason. It

4 See Joas (1985) and Shalin (1984, 1990) on the Mead-idealism connection.
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is a social order that includes any rational being who is or may be in any
way implicated in the situation. [Mead (1930) 1964, p. 404]

A cursory look at Habermas's theory reveals the measure of his debt
to pragmatism. We find in his work the same mixture of historical optimism that harks back to critical idealism and tough-minded realism
found in Progressive Era pragmatism. The belief in "a noncoercively
unifying, consensus building force of a discourse in which the participants
overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favor of a rationally
motivated agreement" (Habermas 1987a, p. 315) is combined here with
a keen awareness that communications remain "systematically distorted" in a "money-bound," "media-steered" society that keeps public
discourse from realizing its full critical potential (Habermas 1987b, pp.
256-82). In spite of these instructive continuities, there are several issues
on which Habermas and pragmatists part company. I shall come back
to the pragmatist critique of Habermas in the next section; here I consider
the points for which Habermas takes pragmatists to task.
From the sociological standpoint, pragmatism's central contribution is
to an "action-theoretic" framework. Symbolic interactionists have explored at length the linguistically mediated interactions in which human
identities are formed, and thereby they have expanded our understanding
of the communicative foundations of life worlds. At the same time,
pragmatism-inspired social theory has little to offer to "system-theoretic"
approaches, Habermas insists. It ignores the normative underpinnings of
society, its functional needs as a system, and it cannot satisfactorily explain how communicative distortions and social oppression are generated
and reproduced. Thus, Mead assumes the normative status for his notion
of the "generalized other" without explaining where its power to control
behavior comes from. Similarly, Dewey is too sanguine about democratization's by-products-expert cultures and administrative procedures,
which are as endemic to modern democracy as they are subversive of its
substance. "We want democratization," Habermas (1986, p. 67) intones,
"not so much in order to improve the efficiency of the economy as to
change the structures of power: and in the second place to set in motion
ways of defining collective goals that merely administrative procedures
or power-oriented decisions would lead astray or cripple."
It is arguable whether pragmatism lacks normative dimension, let
alone whether it is inherently incapable of dealing with structural phenomena, but it is fair to say that system-theoretic issues have not been
central to pragmatist analysis in the past. To offset this limitation of
classical pragmatism, Habermas seeks to complement it with ideas from
several other sources. From Weber, he borrows his insight into the differentiation of value spheres; from Durkheim, the notion of normative con249
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straint; from Parsons and Luhmann, a version of systems theory. From
Austin, Wittgenstein, and Searle, he appropriates the theory of speech
acts, and from Kohlberg and Piaget, the genetic theory of moral growth.
Combining these ideas with the Meadian theory of symbolic interaction,
Habermas formulates his theory of communicative action (TCA), with
its conceptual core-"universal pragmatics." Habermas uses the term
"pragmatics" in a different sense than Peirce, who saw in it a branch
of cosmology dealing with signs in their natural settings, or Charles Morris, who used the term to designate a part of semiotics that explicates the
relations between symbols and their users. The pragmatics that Habermas has in mind is "universal"-it purports to unveil most general
standards that govern rational communications in human discourse.
Drawing on Weber's theory, Habermas isolates three basic forms of discourse or value spheres that become progressively autonomous in the
course of historical rationalization: theoretic/scientific, moral/practical,
and expressive/aesthetic. Communications within each of these domains
revolve around a peculiar validity claim: theoretic discourse concerns the
truth of our propositions, practical discourse bears on the justice of our
actions, and aesthetic discourse highlights the sincerity of our feelings.
Although these validity claims are intertwined with scientific, moral, and
artistic discourses, they are not bound exclusively to these specialized
value spheres. In our everyday life, we routinely assert facts, appeal to
norms, and claim to be sincere; that is, we raise and settle validity claims
concerning truth, justice, and authenticity, and, by doing so, we continuously reproduce our normative, cultural, and private worlds. In the language of speech act theory, we "do things with words" via "performative actions," which are linguistic facts just as they are social facts. Now,
the crucial point Habermas makes is that the validity claims remain
largely unthematized in everyday transactions, during which they are
redeemed not so much by recourse to reasons and arguments as through
strategic action and appeal to custom. It is the task of universal pragmatics to render these unreflexive validity claims problematic, to help settle
them by rational means. Universal pragmatics articulates "a procedural
concept of rationality," "a pragmatic logic of argumentation" (Habermas 1987a, p. 314), and promises to certify "the rationality of process of
reaching understanding" (Habermas 1985, p. 196). Its main premise is
that any communicative act aimed at reaching understanding contains
implicit, context-free, and imminently social standards that must be met
if its outcome is to be judged rational. The situation where such standards
are fully met is called "ideal speech situation."
Habermas does not provide a glossary of rules underlying the ideal
speech situation. Nor does he offer any final formulation, as he continues
to revise the theory he first outlined in the late 1960s (see, e.g., Habermas
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1970, 1979). Still, I think these procedural rules or guidelines for achieving communicative rationality can be codified as follows:
1. An ideal speechsituationprovideseveryinterestedindividuala chance
to participatein discourseand argueone's viewpoint.
2. It is free from coercion,domination,and power play-all purelyinstrumentaland strategicmotifs.
3. It differentiatescognitive, normative,and expressivevalidity claims
implicitin our assertionsand redeemsthem throughargumentsalone.
4. It makesa freelyreachedconsensusthe sole foundationfor democratic
will formationand policy articulation.
5. It leaves a rationallymotivatedagreementopen to revisionin light of
furtherdeliberations.
The thing that strikes one immediately is how well these stipulations
jibe with the critical idealists' belief in Vernunft as "the true tribunal for
all disputes of reason [which] secures to us the peace of a legal status, in
which disputes are not to be carried on except in the proper form of
a lawsuit" (Kant 1966, p. 486). The continuity does not escape Habermas, who grounds his theory on the "principle, that-expressed in the
Kantian manner-only reason should have force" (Habermas 1970,
p. 7). At the same time, Habermas is quick to point out that his theory
is not to be confused with transcendental idealism. Universal pragmatics
presupposes certain standards for rationality and serves as a measuring
rod for judging concrete communicative practices, yet its validity is not
entirely a priori. Procedural standards for rationality spelled out in universal pragmatics are counterfactual: "One should not imagine the ideal
speech situation as a utopian model of an emancipated society" (Habermas 1986, p. 90). Nor should an ideal speech situation be confused
with an ideal type, for the latter professes ethical neutrality whereas the
former is self-consciously normative and prescriptive. Universal pragmatics is the case of "reconstructive theory" (Habermas 1979, pp. 8-9,
178-79); that is, theory whose normative thrust does not preclude empirical validation, even if it can be achieved only indirectly. Taking his clues
from Durkheim's writings on the sacred and Piaget-Kohlberg's research
on moral growth, Habermas infers that the movement toward communicative rationality is both an evolutionary trend, evident in the shift from
sacred to discursive practices, and an ontogenetic current, manifest in
the gradual increase in the individual's capacity for moral reasoning.
At the heart of modernity is the empirically observable drive toward
rationalization, which gradually replaces "the weight of tradition with
the weight of arguments, . . . an attitude of faith based on the authority
of a doctrine with a theoretical attitude" (Habermas 1979, p. 113), and
it is this relentless drive that pulls society away "from the sacred founda251
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tions of legitimation to foundation on a common will, communicatively
shaped and discursively clarified in the political public sphere" (Habermas 1987b, p. 81). This shift, most apparent in the history of the
Occidental world, can be gleaned from the gradual gain in human rights,
the emergence of the independent judiciary, the separation of cognitive
and power claims, the strengthening of voluntary associations, and similar developments that mark the movement, however contradictory, toward communicatively rational forms of legitimation.
Bureaucratization, juridification, mediatization, and such like systemic
dysfunctions point to another, less benign facet of rationalization. Subjected to the capitalist market imperatives, these developments produce
distortions that undermine communicative rationality and weaken public
discourse. As each value sphere evolves according to its own logic, it
becomes insular, impregnable to considerations from other value spheres:
technical issues are separated from moral concerns; ethical demands are
severed from expressive needs; personal agendas come into conflict with
public ones. The mass media further exacerbates these trends by making
a spectacle out of public discourse, turning it into an entertainment:
"Discussion, now a 'business,' becomes formalized; the presentation of
positions and counterpositions is bound to certain prearranged rules of
the game; consensus about the public matter is made largely superfluous.... Critical debate arranged in this manner fulfills important socialpsychological functions, especially that of a tranquilizing substitute for
action" (Habermas 1989, p. 164). Now, it needs to be stressed that the
problem for Habermas is not modernity and rationalization as such, but
fractured modernity and one-sided rationalization, and the cure is breaking the walls that separate value spheres without destroying an insight
peculiar to each. The question, in other words, is how to "bring viewpoints of moral and aesthetic critique to bear-without threatening the
primacy of questions of truth" (Habermas 1987b, p. 398). If this can be
done at all, it is through public discourse, by painstakingly redeeming
the validity claims implicit in our communications and following the rules
of procedural rationality elucidated in the universal pragmatics. One
hundred percent procedurally rational communications may be impossible to achieve, but by opening up the legitimation process to all members
of society and verbalizing norms previously immune to rational adjudication, we, at the very least, assure movement in the right direction. Take
the ideal speech situation seriously, Habermas advises, rid yourself of
hidden agendas and avail yourself of procedurally rational discourse,
and you help bring about an emancipated society, a democracy that is
substantively rational. "The false alternative set up by Max Weber, with
his opposition between substantive and formal rationality, is overcome"
(Habermas 1987a, p. 315).
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Most commentators agree that TCA constitutes an important advance,
or certainly a new beginning, for critical theory. This advance has not
come cheaply. In some respects, Habermas's theory was a step backward
(e.g., Habermas does not show Adorno's sensitivity to the indeterminate
and the irrational). In settling old issues, Habermas has raised new,
sometimes even more vexing ones. Is reason genderless and classless?
Does it have to shed its ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, and personal
colors before it can do its critical job? How can theoretical, practical,
and aesthetic discourses inform each other without losing their vital autonomy? What about contingency and indeterminacy thwarting our best
plans and good faith efforts? Is the lack of rational consensus a sign that
communicative action has failed? These are just some of the questions
that TCA has stirred up and that have generated a voluminous literature.5 I shall try not to repeat the more obvious criticisms voiced in the
past, and, in keeping with my objectives, confine my comments to the
issues on the interfaces of pragmatism, democracy, and critical theory.
FROM COMMUNICATIVE ACTION TO PRAGMATIC POLITICS

The ideal speech situation outlined in Habermas's universal pragmatics
is more than a prescription for successful communication. Enciphered in
its principles is a blueprint for a rational society-a society whose members make good sense, offer rationales for their action, mean what they
say, and practice what they preach. This lofty image, which brings to
mind the ancient quest for a way of life combining truth, justice, and
happiness, has undeniable appeal. It is also flawed in several respects.
My critique is sympathetic, for I share Habermas's humanistic agenda,
yet it is principled because I question some of his fundamental premises.
My discussion draws on the pragmatist ideas left out in Habermas's
analysis, and it is organized around the following themes: disembodied
reason versus embodied reasonableness, determinate being versus indeterminate reality, discursive validity versus pragmatic certainty, rational
consensus versus reasonable dissent, transcendental democracy versus
democratic transcendence, and rational society versus sane community.
It should be noted that I do not try to picture pragmatism as a monolithic
movement free from internal contradictions and inconsistencies. However, the present reconstruction centers on pragmatists' shared concerns,
5 A wide range of critical comments on Habermas's corpus can be found in two
representative collections: Habermas: Critical Debates, edited by Thompson and Held
(1982), and Habermas and Modernity, edited by Bernstein (1985). For a more detailed
discussion of Habermas's theory of communicative action see McCarthy (1978), Ferrara (1985), Benhabib (1987), Antonio (1989), and a special issue of Symbolic Interaction (Shalin 1992).
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and especially on their common stance against rationalism, the vestiges
of which can be found in Habermas's thought.6
Disembodied Reason versus Embodied Reasonableness
My first objection concerns the place Habermas assigns to reason in
relation to nature and human body. Reason appears in TCA primarily
as thinking (consciousness, understanding, cognition). It has no obvious
relation to the human body and noncognitive processes (emotions, feelings, sentiments). What pragmatists call "experience"has shriveled into
verbal intellect, which assumes in TCA a privileged position as a locus
of rationality. Communicative competence is predicated on reason's capacity to be "relieved of the pressure of action and experience" (Habermas 1984, p. 25), to "transcend all limitations of space and time, all the
provincial limitations of the given context" (Habermas 1987b, p. 399).
Rational discourse, correlatively, deals in ideas, concepts, and reasons
rather than in sentiments. The latter represent an inferior species of
intelligence, in that they have limited generalizability, cannot be readily
communicated, are inherently uncritical, and need to be edified by intellect. To the extent that noncognitive elements enter discourse, they have
to be grasped conceptually and measured by theoretically grounded standards, a process that certifies our emotive life as authentic and sincere.
Affects that do not pass the test set up by reason are deemed "irrational"
and subjected to "therapeutic critique," which helps the individual "free
himself from illusions, and indeed from illusions that are based not on
errors (about facts) but on self-deceptions (about one's own subjective
experiences)" (Habermas 1984, p. 21).
By contrast, pragmatists caution against the "hypostatization of cognitive behavior" (Rorty 1982, p. 201) and warn that consciousness "is only
a very small and shifting portion of experience" (Dewey 1916b, p. 6).
"Reason, anyway, is a faculty of secondary rank," Peirce (1976, p. xxi)
remarks, "cognition is but the superficial film of the soul, while sentiment
penetrates its substance." What is important for the pragmatist is that
cognitive behavior belongs to a larger context of material practice, which
philogenetically and ontogenetically antedates mind's conceptual faculty.
Communication is contingent on minding something together, carrying
out a larger act in which participants are engaged bodily as well as
mentally. "Mental processes imply not only mind but that somebody is
minding" (Mead 1938, p. 69). "The mother minds her baby; she cares
6 Among contemporary works on pragmatism, I found particularly useful the follow-

ing: Alexander (1987), Bernstein (1983), Coughlan (1975), Joas (1985), Kloppenberg
(1986), Rockberg-Halton (1986), Rorty (1979, 1982), and Rosenthal (1986).
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for it with affection. Mind is care in the sense of solicitude, anxiety, as
well as of active looking after things that need to be tended" (Dewey
[1934] 1958b, p. 263). Pragmatists refuse to isolate communicative actions
from this larger context, from "the universe of nonreflectional experience
of our doings, sufferings, enjoyments of the world and of one another"
(Dewey 1916b, p. 9). Notice that the pragmatist maxim-knowing is
doing-brooks no anti-intellectualism. Pragmatists do not deny the key
role abstraction and generalization play in theoretical discourse, nor do
they dispute that private interests and crude emotions can distort reasoning. Nevertheless, pragmatists argue, the "conclusion is not that the
emotional, passionate phase of action can be or should be eliminated
in behalf of a bloodless reason. More 'passions,' not fewer, is the answer.

. .

. Rationality, once more is not a force to evoke against impulse

and habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse
desires" (Dewey [1922] 1950b, pp. 195-96). Pragmatists are quick to
point out that "reasoning has no monopoly of the process of generalization," that "sentiment also generalizes itself" (Peirce 1976, p. xxi). Feelings can be universalized and communicated even more readily than
ideas. We share attitudes before we share thoughts (Mead 1934), we
sympathize before we understand (Benhabib 1987), we feel other people's
pain before we know its source (Rorty 1989). Habermas shows little
appreciation for such nondiscursive communication. He elevates the cognitive form of universality above all others and in the process inadvertently devalues human experience as merely private and intellectually
mute. This indifference to the nondiscursive element in culture, to the
fact that just "as the body becomes 'encultured,' . . . so culture becomes

'embodied"' (Alexander 1987, p. xix), is a vestige of rationalism and its
notorious tendency to think in dichotomies, such as subject and object,
reason and nature, sentiment and intellect, and so on. Pragmatists, on
the other hand, are convinced that noncognitive prehensions have an
intelligence all their own, which a radically theoretical attitude tends to
ignore or, worse, suppress. Contrary to the rationalist view, reason has
a lot to learn from noncognitive functions: feelings point to a crisis in
experience, sentiments signal when general principles take a beating from
obdurate reality, emotions provide a running commentary on the success
of our plans. To divest reason from living experience is to disembody it,
to leave it helpless in the face of the perennial indeterminacy and contingency with which humans have to struggle in their everyday existence.
When thinking leaves experience far behind and escapes into theoria, it
is likely to lead practical action astray.
I am not trying to ascribe to Habermas an untenable view that feelings
and emotions are inherently irrational and need to be suppressed in favor
of pure reason. He is also right when he says that some of our sentiments
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are systematically distorted and have to be subjected to therapeutic critique. My point is rather that TCA leaves out from its purview the
noncognitive forms of intelligence irreducible to verbal intellect, what
pragmatists call "embodied" or "concrete reasonableness" (RochbergHalton 1986; Alexander 1987). Reasonableness is minding embedded in
practical activity and embodied in emotionally charged situations. It does
not scoff at common sense or Verstand, and it resists Vernunft'simperious
tendency to subordinate other faculties to its dictate. Knowledge uninformed by feelings and stripped of emotive elements can be rational
without being reasonable; it achieves certainty by discarding insight from
the senses in favor of the rationales laid out by the intellect. Yet, even
though both noncognitive experience and speculative thought partake in
the world, the former is embedded in nature more immediately, yielding
instant information about the changing situation through its affective
states vital to the organism: "Experience is of as well as in nature. [It]
reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an
indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference"
(Dewey [1929] 1958a, p. 4a). "The continuum which [sentiment] forms
instead of being like that of reason merely cognitive, superficial, or subjective . . . penetrates through the whole being of the soul, and is objective or to use a better word extant, and more than that is existent" (Peirce
1976, p. xxi). Reason's access to the world, by contrast, is mediated by
a feeling body, whose testimony certifies our validity claims. It is in the
Platonic domain that reason reigns supreme, the domain where objects
are not contaminated by impurities besetting the mundane realm and
obey laws prescribed by pure reason. As long as reason stays within
this rarefied chamber, it can abstract from concrete situation and take a
profitable leave of one's emotional investments, but as soon as knowers
step into the world of uncertainty, they inexorably fall back on an auxiliary intelligence about things themselves that only noncognitive faculties
can gather. Human intelligence is emotional just as emotions are intelligent, and this is so because we live in the world of indeterminacy that
no rational faculty and theoretical rigor can expunge.
Determinate Being versus Indeterminate Reality
The residual place Habermas assigns to body and noncognitive experience is consistent with a rationalist ontology. This ontology paints an
overdeterminate picture of the universe as factual, internally structured,
determined prior to the knower's engagement in it, and marked by "the
categorical distinctions between the objective, social, and subjective
worlds" (Habermas 1987b, p. 159). The early and relatively undifferentiated worldviews (those centered on mythology or religion) tend to blur the
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distinctions between these three worlds and the validity claims peculiar
to each. Knowledge appears in such worldviews as a mixture of the
objective and the subjective, the particular and the general, the cognitive and the emotional, with no sharp line drawn between verifiable
facts, culturally sanctioned dogma, and patently idiosyncratic claims.
allows one to separate verifiable facts
The modern-scientific-outlook
from commonly held illusions and makes possible, at least in principle,
the rational adjudication of conflicts in the normative sphere. Purified by
proper method from unwarranted preconceptions, ideological obfuscations, and personal biases, public discourse yields a rationally motivated
consensus about facts in our shared universe and points to the most
rational course of action.
Twentieth-century pragmatist ontology has come to us bearing different labels-"pluralism," "perspectivism," "objective relativism," and
more recently "new fuzziness" (Rorty 1989, p. 51). Yet its basic insight is
essentially the same: "Uncertainty does not belong simply to the values, it
belongs to the facts as well" (Mead, n.d., b8, f i).7 "Any view which
holds that man is a part of nature, not outside it," according to Dewey
(1946, p. 351), "will certainly hold that indeterminacy in human experience, once experience is taken in the objective sense of interacting behavior and not as a private conceit added on to something totally alien to it,
is evidence of some corresponding indeterminateness in the process of
nature within which man exists (acts) and out of which he arose." The
pragmatist ontology pictures a universe vastly different from the one
envisioned by classical rationalism, "a universe which is not all closed
and settled, which is still in some respects indeterminate and in the
making, . . . an open universe in which uncertainty, choice, hypotheses,
novelties and possibilities are naturalized" (Dewey [1927] 1950c, p. 52).
Such a universe is full of uncertain outcomes that defy our best efforts
to reduce chaotic processes to a theoretical scheme in which all effects
have identifiable causes and our destiny submits to rational manipulation. Pragmatist philosophy "gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in
which no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene" (James
[1897] 1956, p. 177). "Man lives in a world of surmise, of mystery, of
uncertainties," admonishes Dewey (1958b, p. 198), "'Reasoning' must
fail man." Again, it is easy to misconstrue these musings as a sign of
anti-intellectualism, but the point is not that rational knowledge is impossible or useless, but that rationalists underestimate the contingency en7Mead (n.d.) refers to the George H. Mead papers gathered in the Special Collections
Department of the Joseph Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago. The letters
b and f followed by a number indicate the box and folder, respectively, in which a
particular document is located.
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demic to the world, and they vastly exaggerate reason's capacity to marshal it as an orderly flow of objective being.
What is to be stressed here is that we are dealing not with residual
indeterminacy reflecting the limits of our current knowledge but with
"objective uncertainty" and "indeterminate reality," the emergent universe in which "deliberation and choice are determining factors" (Dewey
1950b, p. 310). It is up to concrete reasoning-always an interest-bound,
socially anchored, situationally specific undertaking-to lift the world
from its natural state of indeterminacy and turn it into a meaningful,
manageable, semiorderly whole. This objective whole maintains its predictable properties insofar as we sustain our interest in it, as long as our
determined collective efforts last. Each time we pass judgment on the
situation at hand-literally terminate indeterminacy-we bring out some
of its potentialities and render obscure its other possible determinations.
An act of doing justice, which a theoretical, normative, or aesthetic judgment aspires to be, is thus inevitably an act of doing violence. Just as it
opens one horizon of meaning it closes an indefinite number of alternative
determinations (fittingly, "to terminate" means to extinguish, to put an
end to, as well as to bring into focus, to frame in definite terms). Whatever determinacy we encounter in the world is, consequently, of our own
making. We terminate indeterminacy in deed and in situ, using terms
supplied by a community, and we do so as participant-observers who are
part and parcel of the situation we seek to comprehend: "If there were
no human beings (or comparable sentient creatures) there would be no
situations in nature" (Gouinlock 1972, p. 8). The knower's embeddedness in the world as a participant-observer has far-reaching epistemological implications, none more important than this: validity claims about
the world of uncertainty cannot be settled through argument in the propositional discourse; the redemption of validity claims is a pragmatic endeavor accomplished via social intercourse.
Discursive Validity versus Pragmatic Certainty
One of the pillars on which Habermas founded TCA is his "consensus
theory of truth" (Habermas 1973, p. 19; 1984, pp. 8-42). We can speak
more broadly about the discursive theory of validation, for all validity
claims, including rightness and sincerity, are at issue. This theory stipulates that validity claims must be redeemed through arguments and that
''communicative actors can achieve an understanding only by way of
taking yes/no positions on criticizable validity claims" (Habermas 1984,
p. 70). If "reasons that force us to take a rationally motivated position
of yes or no" (Habermas 1985, pp. 194-95) failed to produce a consensus,
a communicative action has missed its stated end; such failure signifies
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that the participants lacked candor to carry out communicative action to
its rational conclusion. One notable exception allowed by discursive theory of validation involves aesthetic discourse: "The claims to sincerity
connected with expressive utterance is [sic] not such that it could be
directly redeemed through argument as can truth or rightness claims....
The sincerity of expressions cannot be grounded but only shown; insincerity can be revealed by the lack of consistency between an utterance and
the past or future actions internally connected with it" (Habermas 1984,
p. 41). No extradiscursive means are allowed into theoretical and normative discourses, where participants are compelled toward a rational consensus by methodically advancing well-formed propositions, by clarifying
the internal logic of the argument, and by adjudicating conflicts through
theoretical means.
While TCA attends to discursive validity vouchsafed through propositional formal logic, pragmatist theory focuses on "pragmatic certainty"
(Rosenthal 1986, p. 59), which requires joined action and logistical reasoning as much as argumentative skills. Discursive validation is part of
a larger human practice where all ideational objects have their roots.
There are no objects to perceive, to value, to abstract from, according
to pragmatists, until there has been the "full completion of the act" or
"consummation" (Mead 1938, p. 23). The world that lends itself to
objective judgment is already an objectified world, reality transformed
by our perception, cognition, and collective action, and to say that our
thought is true to this world makes as much sense as to say that this
world is true to our preconceptions about it. Either way, to be certain
about our claims, we have to engage in collective transformative action.
Pragmatists are at one with Marx on this: "The question whether objective truth is an attribute of human thought-is not a theoretical but a
practical question" (Marx [1846] 1963, p. 197). That is to say, there is
more to redeeming truth claims than finding good reasons and building
consensus about them. We need to be certain that the predicated identity
between knowledge and reality can be actually redeemed, and that means
immersing oneself in the situation, joining in a collective act, and carrying it to a completion.
A word of caution against setting up a false dichotomy between practically reached certainty and communicatively established consensus is
called for: one is meaningless without the other. The pragmatist critique
presented here aims at redressing the balance. Rational arguments have
been advanced in favor of releasing mentally ill patients who pose no
immediate threat to themselves and to the public, and a solid public
consensus was built around this issue in the 1960s. Yet this perfectly
rational policy turned out to be a failure, as the logistics of providing for
the ex-patients' needs via neighborhood communities proved to be much
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too formidable for the effective delivery of noninstitutional care. The
moral here is that we cannot always redeem substantive claims-we
cannot be certain about their pragmatic merit-in advance of staking
our action on their truthfulness or, for that matter, justness and sincerity
(the premise equally applies to theoretical, normative, and aesthetic discourses). The pertinent question for pragmatists is not whether a proposition is true according to some intrinsic rationality, but whether the real
situation can be shaped according to a stated rationale. To find out how
consensually validated terms mesh with reality, we have to move beyond
symbolic and performative action; we must try to terminate extant indeterminacy (or reterminate established determinacy) through practical social intercourse. Truth is no longer grasped here in the rationalist manner
as adequatio intellectus et rei but instead is pragmatically conceived as
a practically accomplished unity of knowledge and reality. In this reckoning, it makes as much sense to inquire whether an action-transformed
situation is true to our concepts as to ask whether our propositions correspond to objective reality. To accomplish pragmatically the predicated
unity of knowledge and reality, the knower has to engage in what interactionists call "joint action" (Blumer 1969, p. 17). This region, situated on
the intersection between labor and discourse, has no conceptual footing in
TCA. And yet, this is a domain of the utmost importance, the realm of
everyday living and minding together where theoretical, normative, and
aesthetic discourses merge into one, where humans feel, think, and transact at the same time, and where a different logic is called upon to help
us master everyday contingencies.8 The pragmatist logic is the logic in
use; it stipulates that reality does not always lend itself squarely to yes/
no judgments and allows practical knowers to say "perhaps," "it depends," "who knows," and to use other indeterminate truth values that
help us handle situational indeterminacy. The dilemma that so struck
William James ([1909] 1967, pp. 208, 207)-"either [I] give up my intellectualistic logic, the logic of identity . . . or, finally, face the fact that
life is logically irrational"-is familiar to every practical knower who
had to contend with everyday indeterminacy in the pluralistic universe
and who could conclude, with James, that "logic being the lesser thing,
the static incomplete abstraction, must succumb to reality, not reality to
logic" (1967, p. 207). Binary logic favored by rationalist thought is replaced in pragmatism by the logic in use, also known as the logic of
inquiry or the logic of situation. This pragmatist logic signals a break
8 Various attempts have been made to conceptualize this intermediate space. Durkheim searched for it in the intraprofessional type interactions, as did Parsons, and
Peter Burger detected it in the realm of communal, familial interactions. See David
Sciulli (1988, 1992) for an overview of the issues involved.
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with "the rationalism's disdain for the particular, the personal, and the
unwholesome" (James 1967, p. 309). It stipulates that judgment is "in"
this world as much as it is "about" it, that "the proposition is itself a
factor in the completion of the situation" (Dewey 1916b, p. 338), and it
attends to "the transformation of an indeterminate unsettled situation
into a determinate unified existential situation" (Dewey 1938, p. 296).
The quest for rational truth and moral rightness is supplanted here by
the quest for warranted assertability and practical certainty. Whereas
the former depends on discursive validation and "comparing ready-made
ideas with ready-made facts," the latter requires pragmatic inquiry and
presumes that "both idea and 'facts' are flexible, and verification is the
process of mutual adjustment, of organic interaction" (Dewey [1890]
1969, p. 87). The quest for pragmatic certainty sensitizes the knower
to fuzzy things, multiple realities, semichaotic systems, and it favors
participant-observation as a practical way to fathom objective uncertainty. The radically pragmatic epistemological stance also entails clear
ethical and political implications: it counsels tolerance to ambiguity, calls
for personal responsibility, and encourages rationally motivated dissent.
Rational Consensus versus Reasonable Dissent
My next criticism concerns TCA's emphasis on consensus and its disregard for the constructive properties of dissent. On several occasions,
Habermas (1979, pp. 1, 92) qualifies as "normal" situations and communications that are "largely conflict free." Consensus appears to be
communication's raison d'etre. This is certainly true in an ideal speech
situation where "all participants pursue illocutionary aims without reservation in order to arrive at an agreement that will provide the basis
for a consensual coordination of individually pursued plans of action"
(Habermas 1984, pp. 295-96). The broader the consensus, the greater
the rationality. Anything that falls short of universal consensus is, on
this premise, less than fully rational. Discourse ethics demands that those
partaking in rational discourse should be motivated by the "intention
of convincing a universal audience and gaining general assent for an
utterance" (Habermas 1984, p. 26). Anybody who refuses to join in an
emerging rational consensus, spurns communicatively certified reasons,
or stops short of trying to convince all other participants of the merit of
one's proposition violates the norms of discourse ethics. The spirit of
communicative action militates against accepting conflict as a normal
part of the communication process and dissensus as a rational product
of action aimed at reaching understanding. "To be sure," Habermas
(1985, p. 194) admits, "it is also a characteristic of modernity that we
have grown accustomed to living with dissent in the realm of questions
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that admit of 'truth'; we simply put controversial validity claims to one
side 'for the time being."' Dissent about truth claims, in other words,
is more an expediency than a principled stance in a communicatively
shaped situation; in the long enough run, dissent must yield to rational
consensus.
Pragmatist ontology and epistemology suggest a different approach,
one that accentuates the limits of theoretically grounded consensus and
highlights the productive properties of dissent. "Real possibilities, real
indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God and a real moral life, just as common
sense conceives these things, may remain in [a radically pragmatic] empiricism which that philosophy gives up an attempt either to 'overcome'
or to reinterpret in monistic form" (James 1956, p. ix). The universe so
conceived belies TCA's consensual bias. The inexhaustible possibilities
of being hidden in its depths can hardly be fathomed through a thin-gruel
theoretical consensus. It is as if we choose to understand Bach by reading
the music sheets rather than by listening to his fugues. Communication
at the level of formal notation is what Habermas seems to propose in
order to ferret out the communication's rational content. Yet the score
is not the only thing that counts in music; each recital offers a dissenting
yet valid interpretation or rather improvisation (just think about the
vastly different communication that takes place when Vladimir Horowitz, Glenn Gould, Bella Davidovich, or the Modern Jazz Quartet interprets Bach). The pluralistic universe envisioned by pragmatists encourages dissent, warrants a wide margin of uncertainty, and invites caution
toward policies based on purely theoretical calculations.
Habermas's universal pragmatics leaves hardly any room for the honest difference of opinion. A disagreement that refuses to go away is taken
here as a sign of a failure, and a moral one at that: it hints at a strategic
motif at work and/or betrays a weak communicative resolve. By grounding a rational consensus in sound reasons, Habermas also finds himself
saddled by an awkward implication that whosoever refuses to abide by
the communicatively established consensus is, by definition, less than
fully rational. In the pragmatist reckoning, there is no necessary relationship between procedural rationality and substantive consensus. Public
discourse is as much about consensus building as it is about fostering
dissent. In pragmatist theory, by contrast, dissensus and consensus are
accorded an equally prominent theoretical role. The proper function
of communicatively achieved consensus is to designate reasons sound
enough to merit pragmatic validation. A freely achieved consensus is
usually partial, imperfect, provisional; it does not obviate the need for
conflict, it legitimizes conflict as an inalienable part of rational discourse.
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Nor does communicative action merely tolerate dissent, it encourages
dissent as vital to the community's well-being. Dissent is the first sign
that communication was uncoerced and that participants expressed themselves freely. It is in the countries where the speech situation is far from
ideal that consensus is commonly forged and dissent becomes exceptional.
What makes the dissenting attitude rational is the realization that various
lines of argumentation can be meritorious, that the situation lends itself
to more than one adjudication, that the attendant risks and uncertainties
are great, and that the widest possible consensus is bound to break down
the moment we set out to implement it.
All this should not be taken to mean that discursive consensus has no
practical value. I am not trying to attribute to Habermas an untenable
position that dissent does not matter. It is also true that some basic
ground rules must be agreed upon before we can dissent in a meaningful
and productive manner. Still, I feel that Habermas does not make nearly
enough of rationally motivated dissensus, nor does he explore the practical consequences of dissent with which we must square off once we have
agreed to disagree. Rational consensus, like a generally accepted moral
rule, is but "a tool for analyzing a specific situation, the right or wrong
being determined by the situation in its entirety, and not by the rule as
such" (Dewey and Tufts [1908] 1976, p. 302). We cannot play chess
without agreeing on rules, nor drive a car without knowing traffic signs,
nor live in a community without following social conventions, yet we
routinely disagree about the best chess move, the safest response to an
emergency, or a just solution to a social problem, and the more complicated the situation, the more room there is for the honest difference of
opinion. This goes not only for common folks unschooled in hermeneutics
but also for well-seasoned experts (think about split decisions handed
down by the U.S. Supreme Court). Being at odds with oneself, being of
two (or more) minds on a given issue, is a distinctly human and imminently rational sentiment. We call it "ambivalence," and we find it
especially handy in dealing with the muddled situations that surround us
on all fronts, most signally moral situations, which rarely submit to general principles. "Every moral situation is a unique situation," pragmatists contend (Dewey [1920] 1950a, pp. 132-33): "The primary significance of the unique and morally ultimate character of the concrete
situation is to transfer the weight and burden of morality to intelligence."
The key word here is "intelligence"-the pragmatist name for reason
firmly embedded in a concrete situation, fully in touch with its feelings,
and mindful of the uncertainties and risks involved. Such embodied reason has a modern temper that befits democracy, and the "gospel of
uncertainty" (Kloppenberg 1986, p. 413) it brings into the project of
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modernity offers an important corrective to the emancipatory agenda
championed by classical and contemporary critical theory.
Transcendental Democracy versus Democratic Transcendence
Although the index for Habermas's monumental study does not mention
the term, TCA is very much a treatise on democracy or rather a critical
examination of its perversion in modern society. According to Habermas,
whose views on the subject go back to 1962 and his Habilitationsschrift
(1989), the capitalist welfare state subverts the substance of the democratic process through bureaucratic procedures and mediatized communications which, on the one hand, bring more people into the public sphere than any other political system, but on the other, emasculate
that sphere by whittling down its participatory substance. Late capitalist
society stifles "the possibilities for spontaneous opinion formation and
discursive will-formation through a segmentation of the voter's role,
through the competition of leadership elites, through vertical opinion
formation in bureaucratically encrusted party apparatuses, through autonomized parliamentary bodies, through powerful communication networks, and the like" (Habermas 1987b, p. 365). Communicative action
is bound to be distorted under these quasi-democratic conditions, and a
manufactured consensus is likely to be false as long as capitalist market
imperatives constrict various social strata's access to and participation
in public affairs. Characteristically, Habermas does not cite the incurably
formalistic logic of rational administration that critical theorists have
singled out as the culprit. The gist of the problem, for Habermas, is the
disuse, misuse, and abuse that the public sphere has fallen into under
certain historical conditions. He believes that these conditions can be
rectified and ameliorated through critical inquiry into our communicative
practices. Such inquiry falls within the domain of "transcendental hermeneutics" or "transcendental pragmatics" (Habermas 1979, p. 23),
which offer "a reconstructive analysis oriented to general and unavoidable presuppositions" and reveal "structures of mutual understanding
that are found in the intuitive knowledge of competent members of modern societies" (Habermas 1987b, p. 383). Now, the crucial point in the
whole argument is that the a priori conditions for reaching understanding
explicated by transcendental (or universal, as Habermas now prefers to
call it) pragmatics are fundamentally the same as the conditions for
achieving a democratic society. This is already evident in the rational
procedures guiding communicative action. These procedures, encoded in
the ideal speech situation, can be read as prescriptions for substantive
democracy or "democraticform of decision-making, namely: rationalizing decisions in such a way that they can be made dependent on a consen264
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sus arrived at through discussions free from domination" (Habermas
1970).9 Notice that substantively rational decisions cannot depend on
opinion polling, electioneering, and vote counting because such mechanisms of formal representation transfer individual's discursive rights to
others and succeed chiefly in "a cleansing of political participation from
any participatory content" (Habermas 1987b, p. 350). Formally democratic decisions and collective actions based on them are marred by nondiscursiveness and thus are communicatively flawed, which is why "majority decisions are held [in TCA] to be only a substitute for the
uncompelled consensus that would finally result if discussion did not
always have to be broken off owing to the need of a decision" (Habermas
1970, p. 7). A communicatively sound social order must be based on a
rationally motivated, freely achieved universal consensus, which simultaneously satisfies the transcendental conditions for successful communicative action and for a genuinely democratic society.
There is much in the above argument that dovetails with, if not derives
from, pragmatism. Pragmatists acknowledge that modern societies produce systemic consequences and have functional implications detrimental
to the participatory ideal. Long before Habermas they thought that "discontent with democracy as it operates under conditions of exploitation
by special interests has justification" and warned that "the functional
aspect is contradictory to the ends of democracy" as long as "there is
the opportunity for exploitation of the individual" (Dewey 1946, p. 133;
Mead 1934, pp. 288-89). Since the onset of the Progressive Era, pragmatists stressed that "no government by experts in which the masses do not
have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything
but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few" (Dewey [1927]
1954, p. 208). Habermas's vision of a communicatively sound social order
is also adumbrated in pragmatism, which treats democracy as a form of
communication, "a name for a free and enriching communion" (Dewey
1954, p. 184), and trusts humans to resolve their differences by discovering common goods. "Reason is then a medium within which values
may be brought into comparisons with each other, in abstraction from
the situations," reads a particularly Habermasian passage in Mead
([1930] 1964, p. 406), "and within this impartial medium it becomes
possible to reconstruct values and our conduct growing out of them." In
spite of these instructive continuities, there are several points on which
Habermas and pragmatists diverge.
9 The term substantive democracy is used here in a broad sense that is consistent with

Habermas's vision of a communicatively sound democratic system that is rich in
participatory content and, as such, contrasts with the notion of formal democracy, in
which individuals are deprived of a meaningful opportunity to engage in communicative action.
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Pragmatists are not satisifed with discursive elucidation of common
values and universal principles; "the universe of discourse," they are
likely to stress (Mead, n.d., b8, f8), "is rather the universe of
intercourse"-the latter brings to a test the precepts furnished by the
former. "The ethical problem is always a specific one," says Mead (1964,
p. 405), "the problem itself defines the values." "Especially does the
pragmatist deny that the solution of our problems can be found in any
vision given on the mount or prearranged order of society" (Mead, n.d.,
Addenda, b3,f 7). Universal pragmatics does not exactly envision a prearranged order, but its procedural strictures are too general, too far removed from messy things out there to help us navigate in the world
of uncertainty. The theory of communicative action goads us toward
consensus and demands the unequivocal commitment to certain policies
even before we have a chance to find out whether they pass muster
in life. Only immersion into the practical world, with all its hazards,
confusions, and unforeseen developments, can clarify what a given consensus means, which reality it engenders. Habermas (1973, p. 19) misses
this point when he disparages the pragmatist rush to action and praises
the virtues of discursive situations "which transcend the compulsions of
action." Pragmatists do not deny reason its proper rights-they want
to subject its pronouncements to pragmatic test. Truth is a practically
accomplished unity of knowledge and reality, and that means tinkering
with things and events to make sure they match our theoretical calculations. In the process, we are certain to run into unforeseen circumstances,
unanticipated consequences, and unyielding particulars, which need to
be transcended in situ and not just in theoria. As chaos theory tells us,
minor changes in one variable can have vast ramifications for a system
as a whole. This applies to human societies as well, which evolve patterned ways of handling indeterminacy.
If society is a semiordered chaos routinely generating unanticipated
consequences, as pragmatism implies, then democracy is a historically
specific mode of managing uncertainty. "Democracy expects the unexpected" (Betz 1974, p. 216) and "recognizes that uncertainty is inevitable
and then turns it to positive account" (Dewey and Childs 1933, p. 309;
see also Przeworski 1986). Democratic systems thrive on uncertainty;
they rely on market, competition, ad hocing, and muddling through
as necessary, even if distortion-prone, mechanisms for handling a large
number of incalculable variables. By the same token, democratic polities promote conflicting life-forms, open up public discourse for an everwidening range of participants, and maximize the public's role in defining
the terms in which indeterminacy can be legitimately terminated. Contrariwise, nondemocratic polities seek to expunge uncertainty through
exhaustive planning, centralized control over terminological practices,
266

This content downloaded from 131.216.164.48 on Tue, 7 May 2013 17:09:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Critical Theory
and punitive actions against dissenters who favor alternative terminologies. The less democratic the system, the more it fears discord and values
consensus and the more likely it is to favor a monopoly on the terminological means of production of social reality as objective and meaningful.
This is why pragmatists do not accept consensus, however discursively
achieved, as the highest democratic value. The pluralistic universe presupposed by pragmatist thought precludes any one standpoint from being
anointed as unassailably true, good, and authentic. If any claim merits
such honorific title, it is the agreement to disagree, without which a
democratic process is indeed unthinkable. Democratic institutions give
extra room for the honest difference of opinion, maximize opportunities
for dissent, not just for consensus, and protect minorities from aspersions
the majority is apt to cast on their rationality. Dissenting insights may
be rejected by the community, and for good reasons, yet they are to be
safeguarded because they hint at the unrealized potentialities of being.
To be sure, democratic societies fall short of their professed ideal of the
unlimited access to public discourse and allow assorted elites an undue
influence over public affairs, but this is a poor reason to discount nondiscursive means in politics. When we vote, select representatives, delegate
authority to experts, and vest power in the executive branch, we admittedly move away from democratic discursiveness and thereby open the
door for the kind of distortions Habermas so eloquently decries. But
without these formal means we could not break the discursive impasse
or react efficiently to situations that require prompt action. If we take
discourse ethics seriously, we should keep on arguing until a universal
consensus has emerged, lest our good faith efforts are put into question.
Yet such demands are unrealistic. They are certain to run afoul the hung
jury predicament and founder on the kind of problems Rousseau faced
when he tried to reconcile volonte general and volonte de tous in his
proposal for direct democracy (see Schumpeter 1950, pp. 235-68; Van
den Berg 1990, p. 163). From the pragmatist standpoint, the fact that
participants resort to a show of hands and settle for a less than universal
consensus is no affront to reason. Majority decision serves as a democratic, if formal, device for reaching a working consensus about conflicting rationalities vying for practical validation. To test a rationality means
not only going beyond communication but also assuming responsibility
for our action-not just discursive action but also a joint act, which has
practical consequences and which presupposes a different type of ethics
than the ethics of discourse.
The pragmatic ethics (I shall call it the "ethics of uncertainty") urge
close attention to the "correlation between the means used and the consequences that follow" (Dewey 1946, p. 138). Attention to consequences
produced by our conduct is mandatory because different lines of action
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incur varied risks and beget unpredictable, irreversible outcomes. Rational people disagreed as to whether we should have relied on economic
sanctions to force Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, but once the decision
was made to forge ahead with the military option, consequences befell
the innocent and the guilty alike. The Lithuanian government's bid for
independence was well grounded in "good reasons," yet it produced a
bloody backlash few people were able to foresee. No matter how discursively validated a policy is, responsibility for the consequences should
be borne by the individual. The ethics of democracy are the ethics of
responsibility, and, as such, they contrast with the ethics of good faith
and ultimate ends, which seek to suppress uncertainty and narrow the
scope for individual judgment.
It would be unfair to say that Habermas somehow endorses the ethics
of ultimate ends-his writings on German politics belie any such accusation. Nor does he subscribe to the utopian vision of Jacobin democracy
that imposes its will on the unwilling subjects. And yet in its implications,
Habermas's ethics are not free from some of the difficulties faced by the
moral systems based on good faith and end-rational grounding. Discursive ethics plead for a domination-free life, forswear force other than the
force of reason, and aim at substantive democracy, yet the results are
likely to be ironic. Reason cannot escape domination as long as it seeks
to impose on the world an overarching rationality in the face of the ample
evidence that things themselves do not suffer theory gladly and are sure
to spoil our best-faith efforts. A consensus compelled by no other force
than that of good reasons is still a forced consensus if it chains the individual to a predetermined rationale, situational contingencies notwithstanding. And transcendental democracy is likely to remain a utopian trap if
it does not make room for personal responsibility. By digging the communicative foundations of a rational social order, Habermas gave the
critical-theoretic program a much-needed lift, yet his communicatively
grounded reason still needs to be enlightened to fulfil its emancipatory
promise. It needs to be guarded against its own intolerance and maximalism. It needs ambivalence, common sense, compassion-the virtues
of intelligence that pragmatists consider central to democratic transcendence and sane existence in the world of uncertainty.
Rational Society versus Sane Community
Habermas shares with classical critical theory its predilection for "democratization, decentralization and socialist positions," yet his agenda
is different from the one implicit in the Frankfurt school, for he respects
liberalism, appeals directly to the public, and "demands a remoralization
of politics" (Habermas 1986, p. 71). All systemic distortions, according
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to TCA, are prefigured in the communicative domain. If social organization has turned oppressive and politics have collapsed into administration, it is because our transactions have grown communicatively irrational. With the community as a whole losing control over society's steering
mechanisms, special interests seize the opportunity to assert their particularistic rationalities under various ideological covers. Repackaged for
mass consumption, these (ir)rationalities are translated back onto the
individual plane. Here, through the mechanisms of consumption and
socialization, they are bred into actors' bones, producing distorted needs
and mentalities that, in turn, help reproduce impersonal bureaucracies
and oppressive institutions. The system has uncoupled itself from the
private sphere; it has stripped humans of their dignity, usurped their
autonomy, perverted their needs-it has colonized the life world. To
reclaim control over the system, the community must cut bureaucracy
down to size, symbolically as well as literally, and recreate the conditions
somewhat akin to the intellectual salons of the Enlightenment, where
men and women gathered to make sense together and to furnish intellectual insights that would later be felt throughout society. The task for our
time is to open the political forum to the public at large, refocus attention
on communicative action, and radically upgrade the quality of the processes aimed at reaching understanding: "The reevaluation of the particular, the natural, the provincial, of social spaces that are small enough
to be familiar, of decentralized forms of commerce and differentiated
public sphere-all this is meant to foster the revitalization of possibilities
for expression and communication that have been buried alive" (Habermas 1987b, p. 395). The communicative sphere must be freed from
distortions, and that means taking seriously our assertions about facts,
becoming reflexive about the normative bonds that we forge through our
performative actions, making a personal commitment to be sincere. We
have to learn to speak to ourselves and others in the voice of reason.
Herein lies hope for "the possibility of settling our disagreements by
adducing reasons," of releasing the "emancipatory potential built into
communication structures themselves" and achieving a communicatively
"rational society" (Habermas 1987b, pp. 74, 390).
Once again, we can see how well Habermas's "communicative socialism" (O'Neill 1985, p. 59) fits in with the pragmatist agenda and how
much his specific program veers away from it. Pragmatists agree with
Habermas that bureaucratized social systems should be scaled down and
made accountable to the public. "Democracy must begin at home, and
its home is the neighborly community" (Dewey 1954, p. 213). Like Habermas, pragmatists believe in the "passing of functions which are supposed to inhere in the government into activities that belong to the community" (Mead 1899, p. 369). "The most concrete and fully realized
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society is not that which is presented in institutions as such," contends
Mead ([1915] 1964, pp. 166-67), "but [in] the readjustments of personal
interests that have come into conflict and which take place outside of
court, in the change of social attitude that is not dependent upon an act
of legislature." But look at the values pragmatists praise in the communicatively shaped order: "The community values of friendship, of passion,
of parenthood, of amusement, of beauty, of social solidarity in its unnumbered forms" (Mead 1964, p. 311). This is not exactly the list you find
in TCA. The two perspectives share broad objectives but differ in significant details.
Habermas wants to clear communications from inarticulate sentiments, private interests, logical inconsistencies, and similar distortions
as inimical to reason. Pragmatists find these essential to keeping one's
sanity amidst the semichaotic order that surrounds us in everyday life.
Pure reason has always looked with suspicion at passion and sentiment,
but it has never succeeded in purging itself from their invidious touch.
Reason has shown itself to be intolerant of ambiguity, contemptuous of
common sense, disdainful of compromise, proud of its intellectual machismo in dealing with particulars, and arrogantly dismissive of its own
blunderings in the practical domain. History is filled with records of
human enterprises bearing reason's seal of approval and stoking nothing
but bitter ironies: revolutions that abuse human rights in the name of
humanity; laissez-faire liberalism that spawns monopolies under the banner of free trade; centralized economies that excel in producing shortages
under the aegis of the plan; welfare programs that create a permanent
underclass under the pretext of giving the underprivileged a fair
chance-the list goes on and on. Habermas (1987a, p. 310) has a point
when he sees the problem "not as an excess but as a deficit of rationality," but then he may be too kind to pure reason. He is certainly a bit
disingenuous in his critique of "Western 'logocentrism"' given his own
failure to acknowledge intelligence native to instinct and common sense.
Deracinated affect is a dangerous thing, but reason that plugs its ears to
elude the siren voices of sentiment runs equally great risks. Cultures that
have mindlessly entrusted themselves to the guidance of pure reason and
"undercut instinct, common sense, and the reasonableness of sentiment"
have insured their own "imminent extinction at the hands of unhinged
reason" (Rockberg-Halton 1986, p. 144). "Motivation through 'good
reasons"' (Habermas 1979, p. 200) does not forestall the emergence of
the bureaucratic "megamachine" that devours its creators (Mumford
1967). Pushing body, instinct, and sentiment to the life world's periphery
does not make culture more humane (Alexander 1987). And as Dewey
acutely sensed, abstract thought that shuns the senses and ignores the
ordinary betrays its insensitivity in practical affairs.
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Men who devote themselves to thinking are likely to be unusually unthinking in some respects, as for example in immediate personal relationships.
A man to whom exact scholarship is an absorbing pursuit may be more
than ordinarily vague in ordinary matters. Humility and impartiality may
be shown in a specialized field, and pettiness and arrogance in dealing with
other persons. . . . "Reason" as a noun signifies a happy cooperation of a
multitude of dispositions, such as sympathy, curiosity, cooperation, exploration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit-to follow things throughcircumspection, to look about at the context, etc., etc. [Dewey 1950b, pp.
198, 196]

To guard against its own excesses, reason must be enlightened by
feeling, edified by emotions, ennobled by desire. Above all, it must be
sensitized to objective uncertainty. Coming to grips with the nondiscursive element in our experience not only helps safeguard reason from
overindulging in abstractions but also opens the door to creativity and
social reconstruction. Habermas appears to overlook this point when he
commits himself to "the cognitivist position" that social problems can
be solved within the domain of Verstandigung, strictly "by way of argumentation" (Habermas 1984, p. 19). For their part, pragmatists accentuate the role of intuitive impulses and appeal to artistic imagination as
powerful tools for breaking the routines of experience, smashing barriers
that separate groups, and generating fresh insights into troublesome social issues (Dewey 1958b). "To the degree that we make the community
in which we live different we all have what is essential to genius,"
explains Mead (1934, p. 218). Social creativity involves "those values
which are found in the immediate attitude of the artist, the inventor, the
scientist in his discovery, in general in the action of the 'I' which cannot
be calculated and which involves a reconstruction of society, and so of the
'me' which belongs to this society" (Mead 1934, p. 214). Social change is
predicated here not just on the linguistically mediated "me" as it makes
an appearance in discursive communication but on the instinctive, aesthetic, unpremeditated "I" that bursts forth on the social scene and
makes individual experience valuable to the community as a whole.
Seen from this pragmatist angle, values appear inseparable from habit,
instinct, and behavior; they are "valuations, habitualized acts of judgment rather than simply inert norms" (Rochberg-Halton 1986, p. 16).
Social norms have to find their way into mind's noncognitive recesses
and become suffused with emotions, transformed into habits, translated
into routine judgments: "No social modification, slight or revolutionary
can endure except as it enters into the action of a people through their
desires and purposes" (Dewey and Childs 1933, p. 318). Humane community is first and foremost an attitude shared by its members, a feeling
like empathy or solidarity generalized to a point where it can inform
social routines. Such nondiscursive communications endemic to commu271
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nal being are not to be equated with diminished rationality. "Another
meaning of 'rational' is, in fact, available. In this sense, the word means
something like 'sane' or 'reasonable' rather than 'methodical.' It names
a set of moral virtues: tolerance, respect for the opinion of those around
one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force"
(Rorty 1987, p. 40). 1 The last point hints at broadening communicative
action to include rhetoric and suasion. Communicative, or rather communal, actions need not be a zero-sum game, in which my being in the right
means you are in the wrong. Communal living requires tolerance to
contradictions, a state that TCA proscribes as "a sign of a more irrational
conduct of life" (Habermas 1984, p. 61). Inconstancy and paradoxicality
are endemic to the pluralistic universe, to the "big, buzzing confusion"
that James discovered at the core of our being. This universe is composed
of many verses and is shot through with competing perspectives. It allows
reason to be scattered across disparate social niches; it makes it appear
under jarring sexual, racial, ethnic, religious, cultural, and social guises;
it does not demand that various life-forms be brought to a common
denominator other than their proponents' commitment to coexist peacefully, respect each other's uniqueness, and, where possible, draw on
experience accumulated by others. As such, the pluralistic universe serves
as the epitome of modernity pragmatically understood.
The pragmatist outlook on modernity is closer to Simmel than to Weber in that pragmatists find modernity distinguished by the expansion of
the meaningful domain rather than its contraction, the unfettering of
reason rather than its encagement, the revitalization of the life world
rather than its disenchantment. The pluralistic universe does present
the modern individual with the mind-boggling question of how to wade
through jangling possibilities and keep one's sanity intact, yet pragmatists see this situation less as a threat than a promise, insofar as it makes
for a more meaningful life-as in life full of meaning (James 1956, pp.
184-215). Today's pragmatists feel no compulsion to transform this semirational/semiabsurd world into a unified, logical, communicatively purified, perfectly transparent block universe. To deal with modern life's
chaotic cross-currents, they cultivate "irony," aim for "a de-theoreticized sense of community," and "take seriously Dewey's suggestion that
the way to reenchant the world, to bring back what religion gave our
forefathers, is to stick to the concrete" (Rorty 1985, p. 173).
This modest program has several practical implications. For one thing,
it suggests that not every evil and irrationality can be communicatively
10
The pragmatist argument presented here overlaps with Gadamer's (1977) critique
of Habermas for his indifference to the constructive, creative role that tradition plays
in furthering communal values and living.

272

This content downloaded from 131.216.164.48 on Tue, 7 May 2013 17:09:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Critical Theory
exorcised-some are endemic to human conditions and are best dealt
with through joint narrative, communal grieving, shared muteness,
bracketing, and glossing over. The pragmatist stance implies that universalizing the feeling of empathy and compassion is at least as important
for sane existence as staking and redeeming validity claims. It calls for
irony, humor, and ambivalence in handling many an absurdity of everyday life (Rorty [1989, p. 61] has a point when he calls Habermas a liberal
without irony, for just as any other virtue, earnestness can be carried too
far). Pragmatism also has a clear political dimension. It has been historically aligned with progressive reforms aimed at systemic distortions that
limit access to public discourse, the most insidious among these distortions being economic deprivation (Faris 1970; Deegan and Burger 1978;
Diner 1980; Shalin 1988). At the same time, politics in the pragmatist
key is rather ideologically atonal. Laissez-faire market, nationalized economy, industrial growth, entitlement programs-these are but means to
make our communal being more reasonable and sane, and if the results
prove to be other than expected, pragmatists do not hesitate to acknowledge as much and to try other means. Critics have variously spurned this
stance as conservative, radical, or opportunistic, but it defies any partisan
label.
Above all, pragmatists call for personal efforts in one's immediate
community. In this respect, they follow Chekhov's counsel to avoid
grandstanding and take up small deeds. That is to say, pragmatism challenges us to start with ourselves, become reasonable with those closest
to us, get out to a town meeting, PTA gathering, neighborhood association, and try to body forth a better community by talking, humoring,
and cajoling its members into more reasonable ways. Once our efforts
are met with success in our own abode, they are likely to be noticed and
to fire up action elsewhere. As the Progressive Era pragmatist reformers
had learned, social reconstruction starts in one community, envelops the
city, moves to the state level, and then comes to the national legislature.
The scheme does not fit each case and every country alike, but it suggests
the kind of pragmatic, grass-root politics essential to democratic reconstruction. As long as we are willing to exert ourselves on behalf of our
own community, pragmatists urge, we make the burden of living more
bearable for all and keep alive the hope for emancipation through reason
that critical theory has clung to since Rousseau.
CONCLUSION
In fairness to Habermas, it needs to be said that he foresees some of the
objections raised in this essay. On several occasions, most copiously in
his interviews, he intimated that he personally feels no urge to "bring a
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satisfying order to chaos," that "there is nothing at all to which I have
an unambivalent attitude," that rational society must be "as fallibilist
and as open to self-correction as possible," that "every intervention in
complex social structures has such unforeseeable consequences that processes of reform can only be defended as scrupulous processes of trial
and error, under the careful control of those who have to bear their
consequences" (Habermas 1986, pp. 126, 144, 187). Such statements
qualify only as disclaimers, however, unless they are translated into theoretical terms. In its present form, TCA provides no conceptual room for
indeterminacy, has little use for nondiscursiveness, fails to appreciate the
critical potential of sentiment, and does not square off discursive ethics
with the need for personal responsibility. This is exactly why it is so
important for Habermas and pragmatists to continue the search for common ground. The cross-fertilization is likely to be beneficial for both
sides.
Pragmatists can learn from Habermas how to grasp in communicationtheoretic terms systemic distortions that delimit access to public discourse. The theory of communicative action offers valuable insights into
the discursive bottlenecks that are created in an overloaded market system and that are prone to be exploited by particularistic interests. Habermas has put his finger on an issue that is (or should be) central to the
pragmatism-inspired social inquiry: the need to bridge the gap between
action-theoretic and system-theoretic languages, between micro- and
macrolevel analyses of social processes. Thus TCA provides fresh food
for thought on how the movement toward formal representation in democratic systems affects discursive will formation and what can be done to
safeguard substantive democracy from the distortions it suffers when
responsibility for public affairs is delegated to experts. Finally, Habermas's analysis should help contemporary interactionists to reclaim the
critical dimension of early pragmatism and refocus their inquiry on the
structural conditions that hamper access to public discourse and undermine the conditions for fruitful dissent.
Habermas and Continental critical theorists have still more to learn
from pragmatists. They have yet to acknowledge that reason uncaged is
reason enlightened by sentiment, sensitized to uncertainty, steeped in
ambivalence, willing to come to terms with common sense, humbled by
the consciousness of the limits that nature sets to its ambitions. Emancipated from its bias against indeterminacy, reason is likely to concede that
a consensus based on good reasons alone is a poor guide for action and
that the ideal speech situation must include among its provisions an
agreement to disagree. The question that critical thinkers might want to
ponder is how to make our emotions intelligent and our intellect emotion-
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ally sane. In sum, critical theory could greatly benefit from the pragmatist
insights into embodied experience and objective uncertainty.
These concerns are consistent with the broadly based trends in modern
science, which is increasingly turning its attention toward chaos, uncertainty, fuzzy logic, emergent processes, dissipative structures, and other
patently nonclassical subjects. The time has come to reconsider pragmatist philosophy and interactionist sociology (which derived its inspiration
from, though has not always been faithful to, pragmatism) with an eye
to determining how both have presaged the developments in nonclassical
science." The future agenda includes a sociology in the pragmatist key,
the one that eschews both the irrationalism of Lebensphilosophie and the
conservative proclivities of postmodernism-a critical social science of
uncertainty that combines the commitment to emancipation with the
readiness to meet head-on objective uncertainty.
REFERENCES
Adorno, Theodor W. (1951) 1978. Prisms. London: Neville Spearman.
. (1966) 1973. Negative Dialectics. New York: Seabury Press.
. 1965. "Repressive Tolerance." Pp. 81-118 in Critique of Pure Tolerance.
Boston: Beacon Press.
Alexander, Thomas M. 1987. John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience and Nature:
The Horizons of Feeling. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Antonio, Robert J. 1983. "The Origin, Development, and Contemporary Status of
Critical Theory." Sociological Quarterly 24:325-51.
. 1989. "The Normative Foundations of Emancipatory Theory: Evolutionary
versus Pragmatic Perspectives." American Journal of Sociology 94:721-48.
Benhabib, Seyla. 1987. "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The KohlbergGilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory." Pp. 77-95 in Feminism as Critique:
On the Politics of Gender, edited by Seyla Benhabib. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Bernstein, Richard J. 1983. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, Praxis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
, ed. 1985. Habermas and Modernity. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Betz, J. 1974. "George Herbert Mead on Human Rights." Transactions of the Charles
S. Peirce Society 10:199-223.
Blumer, Herbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Cohen, Ira J. 1985. "The Underemphasis on Democracy in Marx and Weber." Pp.
274-99 in A Weber-Marx Dialogue, edited by Robert J. Antonio and Ronald M.
Glassman. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Coughlan, Neil. 1975. Young John Dewey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dewey, John. (1890) 1969. "The Logic of Verification." Pp. 83-92 in John Dewey, the
Early Works. Vol. 3, 1889-1892. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

" See Shalin (1991) on pragmatism and symbolic interactionism as humanistic counterparts of nonclassical science.

275

This content downloaded from 131.216.164.48 on Tue, 7 May 2013 17:09:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

American Journal of Sociology
. 1916a. "Organization in American Education." Teachers College Record
17:127-41.
. 1916b. Essays in Experimental Logic. New York: Dover.
. (1916) 1966. Democracy and Education. New York: Macmillan.
. (1920) 1950a. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Mentor.
. (1922) 1950b. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Modern Library.
. (1927) 1950c. "Pragmatic Acquiescence." In Pragmatism and American Culture, edited by Gail Kennedy. Boston: D. C. Heath.
. (1927) 1954. The Public and Its Problems. New York: Henry Holt.
. (1929) 1958a. Experience and Nature. New York: Dover.
. (1934) 1958b. Art and Experience. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
1938. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt.
. 1939. Freedom and Culture. New York: Capricorn.
* 1946. The Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library.
Dewey, John, and James H. Tufts. (1908) 1976. Ethics. Vol. 5 in John Dewey: The
Middle Works, 1899-1924. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Dewey, John, and John L. Childs. 1933. "The Underlying Philosophy of Education."
Pp. 287-319 in The Educational Frontier, edited by W. H. Kilpatrick. New York:
Appleton-Century.
Deegan, M. J., and J. S. Burger. 1978. "George Herbert Mead and Social Reform: His

Work and Writings."Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 14:362-73.
Diner, S. J. 1980. A City and Its Universities: Public Policy in Chicago, 1892-1919.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Faris, Robert E. 1970. Chicago Sociology, 1920-1932. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Ferrara, Allesandro. 1985. "A Critique of Habermas' Diskursetik." Telos 64:45-74.
Fichte, J. G. [1794] 1970. The Science of Knowledge. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts.
Forester, John, ed. 1985. Critical Theory and Public Life. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1977. "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection." Pp. 18-58 in Philosophical Hermeneutics. Berkeley: University of California
Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1972. Politics and Sociology in the Worksof Max Weber.London:
Macmillan.
Geuss, Raymond. 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gouinlock, James. 1972. John Dewey's Theory of Value. New York: Humanities
Press.

Habermas, Jiurgen.[1962] 1989. The StructuralTransformationof the Public Sphere:
An Inquiry into a Categoryof Bourgeois Society. Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press.
1970.
1971.
1973.
1975.

Toward a Rational Society. Boston: Beacon.
Knowledge and Human Interest. Boston: Beacon.
Theory and Practice. Boston: Beacon.
Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon.

1979. Communicationand Evolution of Society. Boston: Beacon.
1984. The Theoryof CommunicativeAction. Vol. 1, Reason and the Realization of Society. Boston: Beacon.
. 1985. "Questions and Counter Questions." Pp. 192-216 in Habermas and
Modernity, edited by Richard J. Bernstein. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
. 1986. Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews, edited by Peter Dews. New
York: Verso.

. 1987a. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge,Mass.: MIT
Press.

276

This content downloaded from 131.216.164.48 on Tue, 7 May 2013 17:09:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Critical Theory
. 1987b. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2, Life World 'and System:
A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston: Beacon.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1807) 1967. The Phenomenology of Mind. New York: Harper &
Row.
. (1817) 1975. Hegel's Logic: Being Part of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. London: Oxford University Press.
Held, David. 1980. Introduction to Critical Theory. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Horkheimer, Max. 1937. "Der Neusten Angriff auf die Metaphysik." Zeitschrift fur
Sozialforschung 6:4-53.
. (1937) 1976. "Traditional and Critical Theory." Pp. 206-24 in Critical Sociology, edited by Paul Connerton. New York: Penguin.
1947. Eclipse of Reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
1978. Dawn and Decline: Notes, 1926-1931 and 1950-1969. New York:
Seabury.
Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. (1944) 1989. The Dialectics of Enlightenment. New York: Continuum.
James, William. (1897) 1956. The Will to Believe. New York: Dover.
. (1909) 1967. Essays in Radical Empiricism and Pluralistic Universe. Gloucester: David McKay.
Jay, Martin. 1973. The Dialectical Imagination. Boston: Little, Brown.
Joas, Hans. 1985. G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Reexamination of His Thought.
Cambridge: Polity.
Kant, Immanuel. (1781) 1966. Critique of Pure Reason. New York: Anchor Books.
. (1783) 1950. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Indianapolis, Ind.:
Bobbs-Merrill.
. (1803) 1904. "Lecture Notes on Pedagogy." Pp. 101-222 in The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant, edited by E. F. Buchner. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
Kellner, Douglas. 1985. "Critical Theory, Max Weber, and the Dialectics of Domination." Pp. 89-116 in A Weber-Marx Dialogue, edited by Robert J. Antonio and
Ronald M. Glassman. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Kloppenberg, James T. 1986. Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism
in European and American Thought, 1870-1920. New York: Oxford University
Press.
McCarthy, Thomas. 1978. The Critical Theory of Jiurgen Habermas. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
Marcuse, Herbert. (1934) 1968a. "The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian
View of the State." Pp. 3-42 in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory. Boston:
Beacon.
. (1937) 1968b. "Philosophy and Critical Theory." Pp. 134-58 in Negations:
Essays in Critical Theory. Boston: Beacon.
. 1939/1940. "Review of John Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry." Zeitschriftfur Sozialforschung 9:144-48.
. 1958. Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis. New York: Columbia University
Press.
. 1960. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. Boston:
Beacon.
1964. One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon.
1965. "Repressive Tolerance." Pp. 81-118 in A Critique of Pure Tolerance,
edited by Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse. Boston:
Beacon.
. (1968) 1976. "Postscript 1968." Pp. 325-29 in Critical Sociology, edited by
Paul Connerton. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

277

This content downloaded from 131.216.164.48 on Tue, 7 May 2013 17:09:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

American Journal of Sociology
Marx, Karl. (1843) 1971. "A Correspondence of 1843." Pp. 79-82 in Karl Marx:
Early Texts. New York: Harper & Row.
. (1843) 1972. "Letter to Arnold Ruge, September 1843." Pp. 7-10 in The
Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York: Norton.
. (1846) 1963. The German Ideology, pts. 1, 2. New York: International
Publishers.
Mead, George H. (n.d.). George Herbert Mead Papers. University of Chicago Archives, Joseph Regenstein Library.
. 1899. "The Working Hypothesis in Social Reform." American Journal of
Sociology 5:367-71.
. (1915) 1964. "Natural Rights and the Theory of the Political Institution."
Pp. 150-70 in Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead, edited by A. J. Reck. New
York: Bobbs-Merrill.
. (1927) 1964. "The Objective Reality of Perspectives." Pp. 306-19 in Selected
Writings: George Herbert Mead, edited by A. J. Reck. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.
. (1930) 1964. "Philanthropy from the Point of View of Ethics." Pp. 392-407
in Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead, edited by A. J. Reck. New York:
Bobbs-Merrill.
1934. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1936. Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
. 1938. The Philosophy of the Act. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mommsen, Wolfgang J. 1974. The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political
Sociology of Max Weber. New York: Harper.
Mumford, Lewis. 1967. The Myth of the Machine: Techniques and Human Development. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
Neumann, Franz L. 1953. The Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America.
Crawford: University of Pennsylvania Press.
O'Neill, J. 1985. "Decolonization and the Ideal Speech Community." Pp. 57-76
in Critical Theory and Public Life, edited by John Forester. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press.
Peirce, Charles S. 1976. The New Elements of Mathematics. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.:
Humanities Press.
Przeworski, Adam. 1986. Capitalism and Social Democracy: Studies in Marxist Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rochberg-Halton, Eugine. 1986. Meaning and Modernity: Social Theory in the Pragmatic Attitude. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
. 1982. Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
. 1985. "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity." Pp. 161-75 in Habermas
and Modernity, edited by Richard J. Bernstein. Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press.
. 1987. "Science as Solidarity." Pp. 38-52 in The Rhetoric of the Human
Sciences, edited by John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McClosckey.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
.1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Rose, Gillian. 1978. The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of
Theodor W. Adorno. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rosenthal, Sandra. 1986. Speculative Pragmatism. Amherst, Mass.: MIT Press.
Royce, Josiah. 1919. Lectures on Modern Idealism. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

278

This content downloaded from 131.216.164.48 on Tue, 7 May 2013 17:09:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Critical Theory
Schelling, F. W. J. [1800] 1978. The System of Transcendental Idealism. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Shalin, D. N. 1984. "The Romantic Antecedents of Meadian Social Psychology."
Symbolic Interaction 7:43-65.
. 1986a. "Pragmatism and Social Interactionism." American Sociological Review 51:9-29.
. 1986b. "Romanticism and the Rise of Sociological Hermeneutics." Social
Research 53:77-123.
. 1988. "G. H. Mead, Socialism, and the Progressive Agenda." American
Journal of Sociology 93:913-5 1.
. 1990. "The Impact of Transcendental Idealism on Early German and American Sociology." Current Perspectives in Social Theory 10:1-29.
. 1991. "The Pragmatic Origins of Symbolic Interactionism and the Crisis of
Classical Science." Studies in Symbolic Interaction 12:223-51.
, ed. 1992. "Habermas, Pragmatism, and Critical Theory." Symbolic Interaction 15 (Fall). In press.
Scheler, Max. [1926] 1977. Erkentnis und Arbeit: Eine Studie uber Wert und Grenzen
des pragmatischen Motivs in der Erkentnis der Welt. Frankfurt am Main.
Schumpeter, J. A. 1950. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper
& Row.
Sciulli, David. 1988. "Foundations of Societal Constitutionalism: Principles from the
Concepts of Communicative Action and Procedural Legality." British Journal of
Sociology 39:377-407.
. 1992. "Habermas, Critical Theory, and the Relativistic Predicament." Symbolic Interaction 15 (Fall). In press.
Thompson, John B., and David Held, eds. 1982. Habermas: Critical Debates. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Van den Berg, Axel. 1990. "Habermas and Modernity: A Critique of the Theory of
Communicative Action." Current Perspectives in Social Theory 10:161-94.
Weber, Max. 1964. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York:
Free Press.
. [1904-5] 1958. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York:
Scribner's Sons.
Wolin, Richard. 1987. "Critical Theory and the Dialectics of Rationalism." New
GermanCritique41:23-52.

279

This content downloaded from 131.216.164.48 on Tue, 7 May 2013 17:09:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

